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ABSTRACT
In 2005, the Securities-related Class Action Act went into force
in Korea. Although this Act is similar to the class action rules of the
United States in many respects, only thirteen securities class action
cases have been filed in Korea, as of August 2017. This contrasts
with the active use of the securities class action observed in the
United States. This Comment compares the “law in the books” and
the “law in practice” in the United States and Korea regarding the
securities class action, aiming to find some explanation for the differences in practice between the two countries.
I show that there are many similarities between the two countries’ class action rules, such as the opt-out type class action feature
and the contingency fee arrangement. Some differences, such as
those in fee shifting rules, are mitigated by other rules or through
innovative maneuvering by the plaintiff’s attorney. Other differences that may disfavor plaintiffs in Korea, such as the lack of discovery process, are mitigated by rules that account for the lack of
such a process, such as rules shifting the burden of proof to the defendant regarding certain elements.
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After arguing that none of the analyzed factors provide a conclusive answer to account for the difference in the use of class actions, I argue that the difference may be caused by the distinction in
the filing fee rule. In Korea, the filing fee escalates gradually in a
function to the amount-at-stake. This is not only for the lead plaintiff but also for the class members. So, the lead plaintiff or the lead
plaintiff’s attorney will have to pay the filing fee not only for herself
but for other class members. This rule lowers the incentives of using
the class action for both the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s attorney.
I propose using only the alleged amount of the lead plaintiff’s
amount-at-stake to calculate the filing fee, with a flat fee separately
required for using the class action system. This flat fee will be borne
by the plaintiff’s attorney. This proposal will have the following
merits compared to the current rule. First, this proposal will allow
the plaintiff to consider only the merits of the class action, without
taking into account the difference in the filing fee between filing an
individual action and filing a class action. Second, it will lower the
filing fee, thus incentivizing the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney to
use the class action in securities-related matters. Last, by using the
amount-at-stake for the lead plaintiff, it is possible to use the same
formula that is currently used by courts when calculating the filing
fee for monetary claims.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In Korea, the Securities-related Class Action Act (“SCAA”) went
into effect in January 2005.1 The SCAA is intended to establish special provisions of Civil Procedure Act of Korea that only apply to
securities-related class actions.2 The SCAA has many provisions
that are similar to the U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedures
(“FRCP”) Rule 23.3 For instance, the SCAA adopts an opt-out based
class action procedure.4
The scope of the SCAA is narrower than that of the FRCP because the SCAA allows the use of the class action for only a few
causes of action.5 However, the SCAA does allow the plaintiff or
plaintiffs to sue with a few causes of action in the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (“FISCMA”) of which some,
especially Article 179 of the FISCMA (“Article 179”), are comparable
to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-5 (“Rule 10b5”) cause of action in the United States.6
The Rule 10b-5 cause of action is used extensively in the United
States.7 But, interestingly, there are almost no claims brought by the
SCAA in Korea.8
1 JAI YUN LIM, JABONSIJANGBEOBGWA PULKONGJEONGGEORAE [CAPITAL MARKET
LAW AND UNFAIR TRADE] 541 (2014).
2 HWA-JIN KIM, JAPONSIJANGBEOB IRON [THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION] 43 (2d ed. 2016).
3 LIM, supra note 1, at 541.
4 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 28 (S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법
[https://perma.cc/D2JY-NSLW].
5 See infra Section 3.2.1.
6 LIM, supra note 1, at 452.
7 See infra Section 4.
8 Only thirteen securities class action cases were filed up until August 31, 2017
in Korea according to the notices that can be found in the website of the Supreme
Court of Korea. Suwon District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2009Ga-Hap8829 (S. Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/090427_suwon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PG6-BZK3]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2010Ga-Hap1604 (S. Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/101231_seoul.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VS5L-3EXT]; Seoul Southern Dist. Ct., 2011Ga-Hap19387 (S.
Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/111022_slnambu.pdf
[https://perma.cc/455N-NPTN]; Seoul Southern Dist. Ct., 2011Ga-Hap23003 (S.
Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/111201_slnambu.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6N75-DE4F]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2012Ga-Hap17061 (S.
Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/120309_seoul.pdf
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Various arguments are made about the reasons why the enactment of the SCAA did not result in active filings of securities class
actions in Korea. One scholar pointed to the lack of compensation
for the class representative’s time and effort.9 Another scholar
pointed to the size of the market capitalization of the Korean listed
corporations10 and the number of plaintiff’s attorneys in Korea.11
Another explained that the restraints of the SCAA procedure combined with the general Korean civil procedure work together to discourage the use of the SCAA.12

[https://perma.cc/QD8N-YMVN]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2013Ga-Hap74313 (S.
Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/131016_seoul.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6JVX-TH42]; Seoul Southern Dist. Ct., 2013Ga-Hap107585 (S.
Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/131202_slnambu.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MSB-Z9CR]; Seoul Western Dist. Ct., 2013Ga-Hap35856 (S.
Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/131204_slseobu.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TAE7-2S3V]; Suwon Dist. Ct., 2013Ga-Hap26404 (S. Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/131206_suwon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JB7H-993G]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2014Ga-Hap31627 (S. Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/140626_seoul.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BRU9-9ZLW]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2014Ga-Hap30150 (S.
Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/140714_seoul.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HA5X-HR5P]; Seoul Western Dist. Ct., 2015Ga-Hap9047 (S.
Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/170929_seoul.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2VKR-5RNF]; Seoul Western Dist. Ct., 2016Ga-Hap30418 (S.
Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/160128_slseobu.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DNT7-QN3Y]. Because securities class actions are so infrequently filed, it has been said that the SCAA has failed. See Myungjong Kim, Securities Class Action System in South Korea; The Failure of ASCA in Korea 38 (2010) (unpublished Master of Laws dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with the
Gallagher Law Library, University of Washington) (arguing that the SCAA did not
succeed in taking root in Korea).
9 See Young-Cheol Jeong, Legal Compliance and Korea’s Financial Services Market:
A Strategic Approach, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 483, 508 (2011) (“Due in part to a lack
of compensation for the class representative’s time and efforts, many expect the
Securities Class Action Act to become a dead letter.”).
10 See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1465, 1508-10 (2004) (explaining that Korean listed corporations’ relatively small
market capitalization may negatively affect the incentive to bring a class action
against them).
11 See id. at 1516-17 (explaining that the relatively small number of the Korean
attorneys and their lack of experience in litigating securities class action as plaintiff’s lawyers will negatively affect the number of class action filings at least initially).
12 See Sheron Korpus, Is Korea’s Securities Class Action Law Working?, 25 INT’L
FIN. L. REV. 53, 53-54 (2006) (explaining that factors such as the limits on lead plaintiff and counsel, limits on size and stake minimums, high up-front costs, lack of
discovery system, lack of jury system, and fee shifting deters class action filings in
Korea).
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This Comment compares some differences between the law of
Korea and the United States regarding securities class actions. It covers class action procedures, contingency fee rules, fee shifting rules,
discovery systems, jury systems, and filing fee rules.13 This Comment tries to show not only the differences in law, but also some of
the practices used by the lawyers and judges that mitigate the differences in practice. By doing so, I argue that such differences in the
legal system may not in fact be that different, at least regarding the
effect on the incentives of the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney. However, I find, and suggest a reform to, one substantial obstacle in Korean law that could be effectively prohibiting the use of the securities class actions: the filing fee rule.
This Comment will proceed as follows. First, I will introduce
some theories regarding the role of the players who potentially have
a say in whether to file suit, that is the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s
counsel, in the enforcement of class action. I do not intend to make
any claim here about whether such a role played by each party is a
positive one. Rather, I describe the role as it is currently thought to
be played in the United States. Second, I will introduce the law regarding class action as it stands in the United States and Korea. Because many cases are filed as class actions, under Rule 10b-5, in the
United States, the introduction will focus on rules regarding the
Rule 10b-5 class action. But because there is no such concentration
in Korea, I will generally introduce the substantive law that allows
the use of the SCAA, followed by an explanation of the SCAA.
Third, I will introduce the current practice of private enforcements
on securities class action in the United States and Korea. While my
introduction about this practice in the United States will be brief, I
will go into more details about the practice as it exists in Korea. The
Supreme Court of Korea (“SCK”) uses its website to disclose information regarding SCAA cases. This allows me to collect some details about securities class actions filed in Korea. Fourth, I will explain, and compare, the differences between the practice of
securities litigation in both countries, including the differences in
each respective country’s civil procedure law and evidence law. In

13 Similar comparisons using some or all of these factors have been made in
different contexts. See, e.g., id. (comparing various aspects of Korean civil procedure
and SCAA procedure); Manning Gilbert Warren III, The U.S. Securities Fraud Class
Action: An Unlikely Export to the European Union, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1085-86
(2012) (comparing the general civil procedure between the United States and the
European countries).
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my comparisons, I will try to focus on how the various parties’ incentives in securities class actions are affected by each country’s securities litigation practices. Said section will cover the differences
not only between the countries’ class action procedures, but also between other parts of their legal systems, including their civil procedure laws. Fifth, I will point to a difference between the two countries’ civil procedures that seems to account for the difference in
class action filings: the difference in the filing fee rule. I will suggest
a reform to the filing fee rule in Korea that may allow more active
use of the SCAA class action. Sixth, I will conclude.
2. THEORY ON CLASS ACTION ENFORCEMENTS
The class action system, specifically the opt-out type of class action system, has a distinguishable feature that allows the action to
be filed and pursued even in instances where an individual claimant, apart from the class, would not be incentivized to do so, because
her expense would be higher than the amount she would be able to
recover.14 The class action works as a tool to overcome the free-rider
problem and other collective action problems that usually arise in a
situation where a large number of people have been injured by another person’s conduct, but the injury to many of these individuals
is, taken in isolation, small.15 The U.S.-type class action mechanism,
with its distinct characteristics, collectively solves the problem of addressing these negative value claims — that is, those claims in which
enforcement cost outweighs the value to the individual claimant.16

14 See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 497, 497 (1997) (“Where the single claimant could not proceed individually
because her expenses would dwarf the expected recover, the class action can be
brought on behalf of all who are similarly situated.”).
15 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1991) (discussing the economic rationale for class action).
16 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 291-92 (2010) (discussing the uniqueness of the U.S. entrepreneurial litigation system that includes the availability of class action procedure).
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In the class action context, it may be that any individual plaintiff
has less at stake in the outcome of the case compared to the plaintiff’s counsel.17 This difference in stake between the two could be
quite sizable.18 And this difference may cause the plaintiff’s counsel
to act as a principal rather than an agent, regardless of the legal relationship.19 Moreover, in some instances, this system allows the attorney to seek out the violation because the attorney may expect to
be compensated by the contingency fee amplified in a class action.20
After the plaintiff’s attorney decides to bring suit, the plaintiff’s attorney may identify and secure the client to bring suit.21 Even when
the Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”) to reform the private enforcement system in 1995, the focus was on the behavior of plaintiffs’ attorneys.22 For this reason,
this comment will generally focus on the effect each legal mechanism may have on the incentive of the plaintiff’s attorney, rather
than the plaintiff, when deciding whether to commence a class action.

17 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implication of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-78 (1986) (explaining that the client of a class action generally has only a nominal stake in the outcome of a litigation).
18 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Action:
Why “Exit” Works Better than “Voice”, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 413 (2008) (“Typically, class counsel expects a contingent fee in the vicinity of 25% of the recovery,
and no class member will likely own a similar percentage of the defendant’s stock
to give it an equivalent stake in the action.”).
19 See id. at 411 (noting that the plaintiff’s attorney can behave less as an agent
and more as an independent entrepreneur in a class action).
20 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 17, at 679 (“[B]ecause the attorney as private enforcer looks to the court, not the client, to award him a fee if successful, the attorney
can find the legal violation first and the client second.”).
21 See id. at 682 (“Once the plaintiff’s attorney has decided to bring suit, identifying and securing a nominal client is often only a necessary procedural step that
seldom poses a substantial barrier for the experienced professional.”).
22 See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1490
(2006) (noting that all three PSLRA reform tactics are directed at the behavior of
plaintiff’s lawyers).
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3. THE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
KOREA: THE LAW IN THE BOOKS

3.1. The Rule 10b-5 Class Action in the United States: the Law in the
Books
A plaintiff who files a Rule 10b-5 class action complaint must
publish notice within twenty days to other potential class members
encouraging them to take action.23 Any member of the purported
class may move to serve as a lead plaintiff within sixty days after the
date of the publication.24 The court should appoint as lead plaintiff
the member or members of the purported plaintiff class that it determines to be the most capable of adequately representing the interest of the class members.25 It is the lead plaintiff who usually selects and retains counsel to represent the class.26 The defendants
may move to dismiss the case.27
After the motion to dismiss, the case proceeds to the class certification stage.28 Class action is allowed only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.29 To seek monetary relief, the plaintiffs must also show that (1) questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that (2) a class action is superior
to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.30

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i)(II).
25 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i).
26 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 771 (2009) (explaining
the mechanism for selecting a lead plaintiff).
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 12.
28 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & JOHN M. WUNDERLICH, RULE 10B-5 SECURITIES-FRAUD
LITIGATION 353 (2015).
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
23
24
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It is possible to opt out of a class action that seeks monetary damages.31 If a party opts out of a securities class action, the party is not
bound by the class action.32
3.2. The Securities Related Class Action in Korea: The Law in the
Books

3.2.1. Causes of Action Allowed to Use the SCAA
Article 3 of the SCAA allows the use of the act for only a few
specified causes of action. They are: (1) claims for damages referred
to in article 125 of the FISCMA (“Article 125”);33 (2) claims for damages referred to in article 162 of the FISCMA (“Article 162”) excluding reports on material facts referred to in article 161 of the FISCMA
(“Article 161”);34 (3) claim for damages referred to in article 175, 177,
or 179 of the FISCMA;35 and (4) claims for damages referred to in
article 170 of the FISCMA (“Article 170”).36 Article 125 concerns the
false description or representation of a material statement in a registration statement or an investment prospectus.37 Article 162 concerns false description or representation of a material fact in a business report, half-yearly report, quarterly report, or material fact
report under article 159(1) of the FISCMA (hereinafter referred to as
“Business Report”) or a document attached thereto (excluding audit

31 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors
in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 153738 (2004) (explaining some effects of the opt-out right to the practice of class action
law).
32 KAUFMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 636.
33 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 3 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Jabonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobryul [Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act
No.
14817,
Apr.
18,
2017,
art.
162
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ].
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reports prepared by an accounting auditor), or due to an omission
of a description or representation of a material fact therein.38 Article
175 of the FISCMA (“Article 175”) regulates insider trading.39 Article 177 of the FISCMA (“Article 177”) regulates market price manipulation.40 And Article 170 of the FISCMA regulates auditor’s liability.41 Article 179 works as a catch-all provision, like Rule 10b-5.42
Article 179 states that a person who violates Article 178 of FISCMA
(“Article 178”) shall be liable for damages sustained by a person
who trades or makes any other transaction in financial investment
instruments by relying on violation in connection with such trading
or transaction.43 And Article 178 regulates various actions to deter
fraud; it includes a clause stating that no one may employ any device, scheme, or artifice in connection with trading (including public
offering, private placement, and sale in case of securities) or other
transaction of financial investment instruments, of which the wording is an attempt to translate the wording of Rule 10b-5 into Korean.44

38
Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobyul [Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act
No.
14817,
Apr.
18,
2017,
art.
162
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ].
39
Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobyul [Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act
No.
14817,
Apr.
18,
2017,
art.
175
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ].
40
Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobyul [Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act
No.
14817,
Apr.
18,
2017,
art.
177
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ].
41
Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobyul [Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act
No.
14817,
Apr.
18,
2017,
art.
170
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ].
42 See LIM, supra note 1, at 536.
43 Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeoppe gwanhan beobyul [Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act
No.
14817,
Apr.
18,
2017,
art.
179
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ].
44 See LIM, supra note 1, at 466.
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The SCK has interpreted Article 178(1)1 to mean: all device,
scheme, or artifice that is deemed socially unfair.45 The SCK said
that the test for determining what unfair means is: whether the act
is forbidden by the law, or whether the act makes other investors
make wrong decisions, so that it hurts fair competition and shifts
monetary harm to good investors, which in turn leads to damaging
the fairness, integrity and efficiency of the capital market.46 And to
determine whether an act comprises an unfair act that is prohibited
by Article 178, one must consider factors such as, but not limited to,
the structure of the financial investment product in question, the
method of the transaction, the circumstances of the transaction, the
particularity of the market in which the financial investment product is traded, the terms of rights and obligations of the investor, the
period of termination of the rights and obligations, the relation between the actor and the investor, and circumstances of the time of,
before, and after the action.47 According to the SCK’s interpretation,
it is possible to say that Article 179 is a catch-all provision intended
to deter unfair actions in the securities market.48
3.2.2. The SCAA Procedures
The claim for damages by the SCAA may be filed when damages
result from trade or other securities transactions issued by a stocklisted corporation.49 Because the SCAA only allows certain causes
of action, as seen above, other causes of action, including tort in the
Civil Act of Korea may not be raised in the procedure.50
Anyone who wants to be considered a lead plaintiff in the class
action should file a complaint with an application asking for permission to use class action under the SCAA.51 A claimant who may be

Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2013Do4064, Jan. 16, 2014 (S. Kor.).
S. Ct. 2013Do4064, Jan. 16, 2014 (S. Kor.).
47 S. Ct. 2013Ma1052 & 1053 (consol.), Apr. 9, 2015 (S. Kor.).
48 LIM, supra note 1, at 452.
49 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 3 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
50 LIM, supra note 1, at 545.
51 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 7 (S.
45
46
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considered to be the lead plaintiff should be deemed a class member
who can represent the interests of the class fairly and appropriately,
such as a person who is a class member with the largest economic
benefit in the class action among the members.52 The plaintiff’s attorney should also be a person who can represent the interests of the
class fairly and appropriately.53 A person who has been involved in
three or more securities-related class actions as a lead plaintiff or
lead plaintiff’s attorney during the preceding three years may not be
a lead plaintiff or lead plaintiff’s attorney unless the court finds that,
considering the circumstances, the person has met the requirements
listed above.54
The court shall, within ten days after receiving the complaint
and application, give public notice of: (1) the fact that a class action
has been filed; (2) the alleged scope of the class; (3) the alleged claim
and the summary of the counts; and (4) a notice that any class member who intends to be the lead plaintiff should file an application
within thirty days from the notice.55 The claimant shall pay for the
notice to the court in advance.56 The court shall, within fifty days
from the date of publicizing the notice above, appoint a person who
is deemed to be the most appropriate person to represent the interests of the class as a lead plaintiff from among those who meet the
requirements to be the lead plaintiff, as explained above, and who
either initially filed the complaint or filed an application to be the
lead plaintiff.57
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
52 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 11 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 10 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
56 Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosonggyuchik [Rule on the Securities-related
Class Action], S. Ct. Rule No. 1916, Dec. 29, 2004, art. 4 (S. Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송규칙 [https://perma.cc/WTM975ZD].
57 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 10 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
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When multiple plaintiffs file complaints under the SCAA, the
court shall consolidate the cases.58 In this case, the court may appoint the lead plaintiff and lead plaintiff’s attorney after listening to
opinions of the plaintiffs or the class members who applied to be the
lead plaintiff.59
For a case to proceed as a class action, the plaintiffs must meet
the following requirements. First, there should be at least fifty class
members with the sum of the securities held by the class members
being at least 1/10,000 of the total number of the outstanding securities of the defendant corporation at the time of conduct which is
the ground for the claim.60 This requirement need only be met at the
time of the filing.61 Second, there should be a material legal or factual issue for a claim, allowed the use of the SCAA, that is common
to all class members.62 Third, class action should be a suitable and
efficient means to realize the rights of the class members or protect
their interests.63 Finally, there should be no defects on the application for class action or its accompanying documents.64
The court shall allow the case to proceed as class action only if
the court finds that the requirements have been met.65 The court
should issue an order to prepay necessary costs, such as costs for
notice to the individuals, announcement to the public, and hiring an

58 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 14 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
59 Id.
60 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 12 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 12 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
64 Id.
65 See Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art.
15
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법
[https://perma.cc/D2JY-NSLW].
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expert for appraisal, when allowing the class to proceed as class action.66 Both of the decisions — to allow class action and to deny class
action — may be appealed.67 If the decision not to allow proceeding
as class action is conclusive and beyond appeal, the case will be
deemed as if not filed.68
When the decision to allow proceeding as class action is conclusive and beyond appeal, the court should give notice about certain
information regarding the class action: including, but not limited to,
the name and address of the lead plaintiff and defendant, the name
and address of the lead plaintiff’s counsel, the scope the class, the
claim, the procedure and period for opting out of the class, the fact
that an opted-out member may sue individually, the fact that class
members who do not opt out will be legally bound by the decision
made by the court, the fact that class members can replace lead
plaintiff with permission from the court, and the information regarding fee contract of the lead counsel.69 The court may ask the
lead plaintiff, defendant, or the stock exchange, for the name and
address of the class members, to send the notices by ordinary mail.70
The court should also make the requisite announcement above by
newspaper that is distributed nationwide.71

66
Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 16 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
67 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 15 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW]; Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 17 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
68 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 17 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
69 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 18 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
70 Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosonggyuchik [Rule on the Securities-related
Class Action], S. Ct. Rule No. 1916, Dec. 29, 2004, art. 15 (S. Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송규칙 [https://perma.cc/WTM975ZD].
71 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 18 (S.
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Class members may opt out of the class action before the end of
the opt-out period on the notice above.72 The final and conclusive
decision made by the court binds all class members who did not opt
out.73 After the class certification stage, the case will proceed to the
trial stage, where the court will consider the merits of the case.
4. THE U.S. SECURITIES CLASS ACTION: THE LAW IN PRACTICE
In the United States, 189 new federal securities class action suits
have been filed in 2015, meaning 4% of U.S. exchange-listed companies were subject to such filings.74 The plaintiff’s attorneys earned
more than fourteen billion dollars in fees and expenses from securities litigation during the period between 1997 and 2013.75 In 2014,
the total settlement amount was more than one billion dollars.76 Of
the cases filed in 2015, about 84% included Rule 10b-5 claims.77 And

Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
72 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 28 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
73 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 37 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
74 Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings—2015 Year in Review 1
(2016), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2015/CornerstoneResearch-Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2015-YIR.pdf [https://perma.cc/99ERP2T8].
75 Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, 69 BUS. LAW. 307, 308-09 (Feb. 2014).
76 Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Settlements—2014 Review and
Analysis 1 (2015), https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/701f936e-ab1d425b-8304-8a3e063abae8/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2014-Review-andAnalysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L8Y-KBA6].
77 Cornerstone Research, supra note 74, at 8.
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almost all of the allegations in the claims filed included misrepresentation in the financial documents.78 But the possibility of the auditor being named as defendant in the United States is quite low.79
Not many cases actually go to trial because most cases are either
dismissed or settled.80 According to one study, only twenty-one
cases have gone to trial and only fifteen cases have reached a verdict
or judgment out of 4,435 securities class action suits filed between
the enactment of PSLRA and December 31th, 2014.81 No trial was
held in 2015.82 Another study found that, of securities law cases
seeking damages from 1980 to 2005, only thirty-seven cases were
tried to judgment against public companies, their officers and directors, or both.83
5. THE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION OF KOREA: THE LAW IN PRACTICE

5.1. General Introductions on Filing of Class Actions in Korea
As of August 31, 2017, thirteen SCAA cases have been filed in
the courts of Korea.84 The SCK gives notices on those cases on its

78 Id. (finding 99% of the filed securities class action cases contained misrepresentation in the financial documents).
79 Id. (finding that the percentage of the auditor being named in securities class
action cases that has been filed each year in the United States did not rise above 3%
between 2011 and 2015).
80 Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland & Matthew Goforth, When Are Securities
Class Actions Dismissed, When Do They Settle, and for How Much? An Update, 23 PLUS
1 (April. 2013).
81 Renzo Comolli & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action
Litigation: 2014 Full-Year Review 36 (2015), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2015/PUB_2014_Trends_0115.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QB3Y-MAF6].
82 Svetlana Starykh & Stefan Boettrich, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action
Litigation: 2015 Full-Year Review 38 (2016) http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016/2015_Securities_Trends_Report_NERA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8VNX-MTSN].
83 Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2006).
84 See supra note 8 (listing cases filed).
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website,85 which may be used to follow the case docket summary of
each case, also accessible on its website.86 I have summarized the
cases in appendix Table A (“Appendix A”).
Of the thirteen SCAA cases, two were consolidated because they
concerned the same facts, but involved different defendants.87 Another three cases were consolidated because they also concerned the
same facts, but with different defendants.88 So, the actual case count
is ten. Of the ten cases, two have been settled.89 And one court
found for the plaintiffs.90 The other cases are still pending, at various stages, with some courts granting certification.91
None of the lead plaintiffs in the SCAA cases seem to be institutional investors, such as mutual funds or pension funds.92 Most of
the plaintiffs were individuals, with only a few corporations joining
the individuals as plaintiffs.93 Some cases were filed with multiple
plaintiffs, with one case having over 1,000 plaintiffs.94
Regarding the plaintiff’s counsel, it is interesting to note that the
lawyers who had been the first to make use of the SCAA and who
had succeeded in managing the case until the end did not engage in
any other class actions.95 One firm, Hannuri Law, holds six cases, and
two different law firms hold one case each.96 The lead plaintiff in
85 Sup. Ct. S. Kor., Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosong,
http://www.scourt.go.kr/portal/notice/securities/securities.jsp
[https://perma.cc/9FGF-Y2GX].
86 Sup. Ct. S. Kor., Nauisageongeomsaek, http://www.scourt.go.kr/portal/information/events/search/search.jsp [https://perma.cc/3GNP-Z992].
87 See infra Appendix A.
88 See id.
89 See Yeongkil Jo, Bunbaejongryobogoseo [Report on Final Distributions] (Jan.
30,
2012),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/120130_suwon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ESU3-T5TG]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., Gonggo [Notice] (Feb. 10,
2017),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/170210_seoul.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LA4M-NXG5].
90 See Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2012Ga-Hap17061, Jan. 20, 2017 (S. Kor.).
91 See infra Appendix A.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See id. In the United States, aggregation of plaintiffs was a method used by
counsel to secure the position of lead counsel. See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions,
and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 63-64 (2001). However, this may not be the case here, because
there were no competing filings for lead plaintiff in cases filed in Korean courts. See
infra Appendix A.
95 See infra Appendix A.
96 See id.
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one of the two consolidated cases is being counseled by two different law firms, and of the two law firms, one had a lawyer, Park Pilseo, who left Hannuri Law to join it at the time the class action was
filed.97 Since then, the lawyer, Park Pilseo, has rejoined Hannuri
Law.98 Of the law firms involved in these SCAA cases, only Hannuri
Law seems to define itself as a plaintiff’s law firm, according to its
website.99
There are differences between the cases regarding the characteristics of the defendants. The first case that has been filed as a class
action had two directors as codefendants, but the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the cases against them before the settlement.100 In
every case where the lead counsel is Hannuri Law, the plaintiffs
named the corporation as the only defendant.101 But in other cases,
the plaintiffs have named individuals also as codefendants.102
5.2. The First Case
The first class action case under the SCAA was filed in 2009.103
The plaintiffs were a private equity fund and its director, and the
defendants were a corporation, whose stocks were traded on the
Kosdaq market, and its directors.104 The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant corporation omitted a huge loss incurred to the corporation by a certain derivative product from the financial statement,
causing the financial statement to show net profit instead of net loss,
See id.
See id.
99 HANNURI
LAW,
http://www.hannurilaw.co.kr
[http://web.archive.org/web/20170930213248/http://www.hannurilaw.co.kr/] (last visited
Sept. 30, 2017); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Law, Culture, and Incentives, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1895, 1915 (2017) (noting that
“one law firm has brought the majority of securities class actions filed in South Korea.”).
100 See infra Appendix A.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 See Suwon Dist. Ct., Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosongui sojegi gonggo [Notice on Filing of Securities-related Class Action] (Apr. 29, 2009),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/090427_suwon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X37T-9KL4].
104
Suwon Dist. Ct., 2009Ka-Gi1048, Jan. 21, 2010 (S. Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/100203_suwon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TYZ6-AFWE].
97
98
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and that the class members bought the stocks of the corporation because they relied on the disclosed financial statement.105 This allegedly resulted in a loss for the plaintiffs that should be compensated
by the defendants.106
The court decided to permit the case to proceed as a class action
on January 21, 2010, while allowing class members to opt out until
March 26, 2010.107 The scope of the class members was: members
who were certified as stock holders of the corporation as of December 19, 2008, and who bought the stock from the period of August
14, 2008, when the corporation made the alleged misrepresentation,
to December 19, 2008, when the corporation made the adjustment.108
During the opt-out period, fifteen class members chose to opt out.109
The case was permitted to settle on April 30, 2010, which is about
a year after the case was first filed.110 With regards to the terms of
settlement, the corporation initially agreed to pay 2,900,000,000
won,111 half in cash and the rest in its treasury stock.112 But because
fifteen class members chose to opt out, the settlement resulted in the
corporation agreeing to pay 1,371,696,201 won and treasury stock of
199,664 that amounts to 2,743,392,402 won, to the rest of the class
members.113 Each party agreed to pay for its own legal fees.114 On

Suwon Dist. Ct., supra note 103.
Id.
107 Suwon Dist. Ct., Sosongheogagyeoljeong gojiseo [Notice on Decision to Permit
Class Action Proceeding] (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/100203_suwon_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4B5-FJT2].
108 Suwon
Dist. Ct., 2009Ka-Gi1048, Jan. 21, 2010 (S. Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/100203_suwon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FA8Z-E8RQ].
109 Suwon
Dist. Ct., 2009Ga-Hap8829, Apr. 30, 2010 (S. Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/20100430_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3R3ZJ2P].
110 Id.
111 This amount is approximately 2,617,329 U.S. dollars calculated by the currency exchange rate of 1,108 won per one U.S. dollar as of April 30, 2010. For the
currency exchange rate as of April 30, 2010, see Foreign Exchange Rates: Historical
Rates for the South Korean Won, FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat00_ko.htm [https://perma.cc/B26R-J5HV].
112 Suwon
Dist. Ct., 2009Ga-Hap8829, Apr. 30, 2010 (S. Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/20100430_01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AAT2-8726].
113 Id.
114 Id.
105
106
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July 14, 2010, the court decided to choose one of the plaintiff’s counsels as the distribution administrator.115 The distribution administrator submitted the distribution plan on August 6, 2010, which the
court granted on September 30, 2010, with only a few modifications.116 The court granted to the plaintiff’s counsel fees that
amounted to 20% of the settlement, that is 274,339,240 won,117 and
treasury stock of 39,932.118 The cost incurred during the proceeding
that included filing fee, fee for sending individual notice and fee for
public notice (10,878,710 won), was to be deducted from the settlement amount.119 Because the plaintiff’s counsel also undertook the
position of distribution administrator, the cost and fee for the distribution would be paid to the plaintiff’s counsel.120 However, the
plaintiff’s counsel agreed not to be paid a fee for the distribution,
nor be reimbursed the cost of the distribution, which the court estimated to be approximately 90,898,250 won.121
The notice announcing the ending of the distribution was made
public on January 30, 2012.122 According to the notice, 134,720 stocks
and 926,956,248 won have been distributed to the class members.123
The rest of the stocks, and the money, were returned to the defendant.124

115 Suwon
Dist. Ct., 2009Ga-Hap8829, July 14, 2010 (S. Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/100714_suwon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VQQ9-ZPXR].
116 Suwon
Dist. Ct., 2009Ga-Hap8829, Sept. 30, 2010 (S. Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/100930_suwon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YZN8-4QU5].
117 This amount is approximately 247,599 U.S. dollars calculated by the currency exchange rate of 1,108 won per one U.S. dollar as of April 30, 2010. For data
on currency exchange rate as of April 30, 2010, see FED. RES. SYS., supra note 111.
118 Suwon
Dist. Ct., 2009Ga-Hap8829, Sept. 30, 2010 (S. Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/100930_suwon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8MH-5RWF].
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Jo, supra note 89.
123 Id.
124 Id.
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5.3. Decisions by the Lower Courts
Currently five cases have proceeded to the trial stage.125 I have
summarized the current statuses of the cases in appendix Table B
(“Appendix B”).126 As discussed earlier, only two cases have been
settled, and one court found for the plaintiffs.127 The rest of the cases
are still pending at various stages.128
The courts have so far been quite willing to interpret the requirements to allow certification.129 One court was content to find the
commonality requirement met when the alleged cause of action of
the plaintiffs was about Article 179.130 Another court found commonality in an Article 125 case because the materiality element and
loss causation element were both common to all class members.131
The court went on to say that the fact that a certain subset of the class
members may have an affirmative defense to the claim is not enough
to deny the commonality requirement in an Article 125 class action.132 Moreover, regarding the suitability requirement, the courts
found: the loss to the individual plaintiff being small is enough to
find that the plaintiffs may not be expected to file a suit individually,
which makes the class action a suitable and efficient alternative.133

See infra Appendix B.
In Korea, the case regarding petition for class certification and the case regarding actual complaint are given separate case numbers. When the case for class
certification is appealed the case number for class certification will change accordingly. However, the case number for the claim itself, in principle, will stay the
same.
127 Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2012Ga-Hap17061, Jan. 20, 2017 (S. Kor.); Jo, supra
note 89; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., supra note 89.
128 See infra Appendix A.
129 Although some lower courts have denied certification, they were overturned. See Appendix B. Currently only one case, which has been appealed, has
been denied certification. See Appendix B.
130 See Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct]., 2015Ra619, Jan. 29, 2016 (S. Kor.).
131 See Seoul High Ct., 2013Ra20093, Feb. 6, 2015 (S. Kor.).
132 Id.
133 Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra656 & 657 (consol.), Nov. 16, 2016 (S. Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/151117_slgodung.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NZY7-PMYA].
125
126
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6. THE COMPARISON
The difference in practice between Korea and the United States
is quite striking. In the United States, nearly 200 cases are filed every
year with over a billion dollars at stake. In Korea, on average, fewer
than one SCAA case was filed every year, and only three cases resulted in settlements or a final decision by the court in the eleven
years since the enactment of the SCAA.134 While it may be too early
to tell, although eleven years since enactment of the SCAA is not a
short period, the current practice in Korea could mean that the implementation of an opt-out type class action system, standing alone,
may not be enough to encourage private enforcement.
In this section, I will compare some differences between the civil
procedures of the two countries that may be affecting the difference
in practice. The first part will focus on the specific rules pertaining
to the class action, while the second part will consider the differences more broadly by including the differences in general civil procedure mechanics.
6.1. Comparing the Class Action Procedures

6.1.1. The Requirements at the Class Certification Stage
As discussed above, FRCP 23 requires predominance for the
class certification of a Rule 10b-5 class action.135 This requirement
allows the court to exercise considerable discretion in determining
what causes of action are suitable on their facts for class-wide determination.136 In the Rule 10b-5 class action context, the Supreme
Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) decided that the reliance requirement needs to be investigated at the class certification stage.137

See infra Appendix A.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
136 Coffee, Jr., supra note 16, at 299.
137 Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 910-11 (2013).
134
135
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Expert witnesses are used to prove not only reliance, but also materiality and loss causation.138 The court, by using the fraud-on-themarket theory as a basis for allowing presumption of reliance,
turned the reliance inquiry into an analysis of market efficiency.139
So, how do you prove market efficiency? SCOTUS was not clear
on this point, so it was left to the lower courts to find an appropriate
test to determine whether a security was traded in an efficient market.140 No uniform test has been accepted by the lower courts.141 In
Cammer v. Bloom, the court discussed the following factors as relevant to determining market efficiency for a given security: (1) eligibility to file an SEC form S-3, (2) average weekly trading volume, (3)
analyst coverage, (4) existence of market makers and arbitrageurs,
and (5) price reaction to company-specific information.142 Accordingly, class certification in the United States requires the use and expenditure of various resources, including hiring expert witness for
the plaintiff.143
Although it may be too early to tell, this might not be the case in
Korea. As is shown above, there is no predominance requirement
in Korea. Furthermore, the court is not explicitly required to inquire
into reliance or market efficiency at the class certification stage.144
Conflicts between the parties during the class certification stage center around the question of whether the alleged claim should be allowed to proceed by the SCAA as a matter of law. The courts do not

138 See Jonah B. Gelbach, Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Valid Inference in Single-Firm, Single-Event Studies, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 495, 501 (2013) (“Plaintiffs
seeking to meet the reliance, materiality, and loss causation elements of a securities
fraud case can use event study evidence to establish that a security’s price movement was associated with allegedly fraudulent statements.”).
139 Fisch, supra note 137, at 897.
140 See Jeffrey L. Oldham, Taking “Efficient Markets” out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995,
1015 (2003).
141 See id. (“Yet no particular test or set of factors has been universally accepted
by a majority of courts across the country.”).
142 See Paul A. Ferrillo, Frederick C. Dunbar & David Tabak, The “Less Than”
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis: Requiring More Proof From Plaintiffs in Fraud-onthe-Market Cases, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 90-93 (2004).
143 See KAUFMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 355 (“In addition, an expert is vital at
class certification. An expert may be able to perform the necessary event study at
class certification and demonstrate common issues, such as reliance and loss causation.”).
144 See, e.g., Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra619, Jan. 29, 2016 (S. Kor.) (certifying class
without any mention of market efficiency).
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seem to require any reports by expert witnesses to make this determination.145 Although the SCAA requires the plaintiff to prepay
necessary costs, such as costs for notice, announcement, and appraisal, the prepayment is required only when it becomes definite
by the order of the court that the case will proceed as a class action.146
These differences in class certification procedures between the
United States and Korea can be quite significant. Because the plaintiff’s counsel in the United States expends a significant amount of
resources in the class certification stage, the risk of not getting a class
certification after spending so much time, and expending so many
resources, must be seriously considered. But in Korea, the plaintiff’s
counsel has the advantage of waiting for the class to be certified before expending such resources.147 All things being equal, this difference in procedure arguably should incentivize plaintiff’s counsel in
Korea to file a class action claim more actively, when compared to
its U.S. counterparts.
6.1.2. Restriction on Cases the Plaintiff’s Counsel May File
As was discussed above, there are limitations as to how many
cases a plaintiff’s counsel may file as class actions under the SCAA

145 See, e.g., Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra619, Jan. 29, 2016 (S. Kor.) (certifying class
without any mention of expert witness opinion).
146 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 16 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
147 The courts differ on the amount to be prepaid. Compare Seoul High Ct.,
2015Ra656
&
657
(consol.),
Nov.
16,
2016
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/151117_slgodung.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NZY7-PMYA], and Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra619, Jan. 29, 2016 (S.
Kor.) (ordering prepayment of 40,000,000 won, which consists of fee for sending
notice 10,000,000 won, fee for giving notice newspaper etc. 20,000,000 won, fee for
appraisal 5,000,000 won and other fees 5,000,000 won), with Seoul Southern Dist.
Ct., 2011Ka-Gi2010, Sept. 27, 2013 (S. Kor.) (ordering prepayment of 51,000,000 won,
which consists of fee for sending notice 16,000,000 won, fee for giving notice newspaper etc. 20,000,000 won, fee for appraisal 10,000,000 won and other fees 5,000,000
won). The court will return the unused amount of the prepaid fees when the case
settles or otherwise ends. See Suwon Dist. Ct., 2009Ga-Hap8829, Sept. 30, 2010 (S.
Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/100930_suwon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MH45-U9XW].
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during a given time period in Korea.148 The clause does not specify
whether the lawyer as an individual or a firm is subject to the restriction, leaving this to the courts for interpretation.149 But, there is
no such restriction in the United States, which allows the plaintiff’s
attorney to file multiple cases in an attempt to diversify.150
This difference in regulation may partially affect plaintiff’s attorneys’ limitations to diversifying litigation risks. In the United States,
plaintiff’s attorneys, as repeat players of litigation, may be able to
diversify litigation risk by choosing to handle multiple cases, although somewhat to the lesser degree when compared to securities
investors.151 But Korean attorneys may be less capable of diversifying the litigation risk by holding multiple class actions, because they
may only be involved in three cases over the past three years.152 Risk
aversion could be difficult to address in this kind of legal framework, accounting for the fact the many attorneys may decide not to
pursue class actions.153
However, bringing multiple class actions is not the only means
by which plaintiff’s attorneys diversify. Attorneys in Korea may diversify by representing non-class-action cases as well.154 Moreover,
as we have seen above, one firm, Hannuri Law, currently holds six
cases that are still pending in various courts.155 The defendant in
one of the cases has petitioned for disqualification of Hannuri Law

148 See Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art.
11
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법
[https://perma.cc/D2JY-NSLW].
149 Id.
150 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 17, at 705.
151 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 17, at 705 (“Phrased more generally, portfolio diversification is a strategy that permits the plaintiff’s attorney, much as any investor,
to reduce the variance associated with an expected return.”).
152 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 11 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
153 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model
of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 280-81 (1983) (explaining that risk aversion affects the attorney’s litigation strategy).
154 Restriction of multiple class action filings do not fully limit the power to
diversify because the plaintiff’s attorney is free to retain other kinds of cases. I
thank Professor Rock for pointing this out to me.
155 See infra Appendix A.
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for this reason.156 But the court decided that, considering the firm’s
past experience in litigating securities related claims, the firm is
deemed to be able to fairly and appropriately represent the total
class members, allowing it to remain as counsel.157
The decision made by the lower court in effect may lower the
hurdle imposed on the plaintiff’s attorney, because by its logic, the
experience of handling securities class action cases qualifies as a reason for excepting the allowed limit to the number of cases a plaintiff’s counsel may file in a given period. If the SCK affirms the lower
court’s holding on this issue, then the gap between the United States
and Korea may effectively be narrowed.158
6.2. Comparing the General Civil Procedure Process

6.2.1. Rule on Contingency Fees
Contingent fee arrangement is one of the key legal rules that allows lawyers in the United States to act as private attorneys general.159 But many countries around the world do not allow contingency
fee
arrangements,
thereby
discouraging
active
160
entrepreneurial litigation filed by plaintiffs’ attorneys. This is not
the case in Korea. Until recently, the SCK found contingent fee arrangements between parties to be effective in principle.161 The SCK
decided that a contingent fee arrangement regarding a criminal case
is void for public policy reasons in 2015.162 But the SCK made it clear
that a contingent fee arrangement for a civil case should be allowed.163 So, of the critical factors that allow plaintiff’s counsel to
Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra619, 14-15, Jan. 29, 2016 (S. Kor.).
Id.
158 The SCK did affirm the case, but did not specifically address the issue. See
S. Ct., 2016Ma251, May 27, 2016 (S. Kor.).
159 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 17, at 667-70.
160 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION 199 (2015) (“Most
countries also prohibit private attorneys from charging fees based on the amount
of the damages obtained, thereby barring ‘entrepreneurial litigation’ (at least to the
extent that the attorney serves as the entrepreneur).”).
161 S. Ct., 2015Da200111, July 23, 2015 (S. Kor.).
162 Id.
163 Id.
156
157
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act as an entrepreneur, one is not much different between the two
countries.164
6.2.2. Rule on Fee Shifting
Fee shifting rules may also affect the use of class action litigation,
because fee shifting may chill litigation.165 On the other hand, the
American rule, wherein each party is required to pay for its own
legal fees without regard to the outcome of the case, may encourage
the filing of litigation.166
In the United States, each party to a litigation typically pays its
own legal fees.167 But in Korea, the fee is usually shifted to the losing
party.168
However, it should be noted that the costs paid or prepaid by
the plaintiff’s counsel, such as filing fees, costs for individual notice,
costs for public announcement, and costs for appraisal, will also be
shifted to the defendant in the event that the plaintiff wins.169 So, if
the fee shifting rule deters cases, it may deter more cases without
merit than cases with merit.170
We should also note that there is a cap on the amount of attorney’s fees that may be shifted in Korea.171 The cap is calculated by a
function of the amount-at-stake and the fee awarded (or promised

164 Different types of contingent fee arrangements may affect the incentives of
the plaintiff’s counsel differently resulting in different behaviors. See generally, John
C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 33-48 (1985) (explaining the different behaviors
of the plaintiff’s counsel under compensatory schemes which compensate time
spent and under compensatory schemes which compensates by a function of recovered loss).
165 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 160, at 84.
166 See id. at 165.
167 See Cox, supra note 14, at 497.
168 Minsasosongbeob [Civil Procedure Act], Act No. 547, Apr. 4, 1960, amended
by
Act
No.
13952,
Feb.
3,
2016,
art.
98
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/민사소송법 [https://perma.cc/EU3B-3XPC].
169 Id.
170 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 160, at 166-67.
171 Minsasosongbeob [Civil Procedure Act], Act No. 547, Apr. 4, 1960, amended
by
Act
No.
13952,
Feb.
3,
2016,
art.
109
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/민사소송법 [https://perma.cc/EU3B-3XPC].
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to be awarded) to the counsel by the prevailing party.172 This cap
may work as a device that mitigates the threat of punitive fee shifting.173 Moreover, the cap allows plaintiff’s attorney to calculate the
cost to be paid to the defendant in advance when deciding whether
to bring suit.
Lastly, the fee shifting rule will matter less if it is not actively
enforced. For the prevailing party to be reimbursed its legal fees in
Korea, it must first file a claim requesting the court to calculate the
amount to be shifted.174 So far, there has been no SCAA case decided
against the plaintiff that has been subject to the calculation of legal
fees.175
Do prevailing parties’ legal fees actually get reimbursed by the
losing parties in Korea? It is difficult to gather data on the current
practice of private negotiations being made between the parties. But
the SCK provides public annual statistics on decided civil cases and
filings of claims for calculation of legal fees. By comparing the civil
cases which are decided with the filings for calculation of legal fees,
I provide a rough proxy for the enforcement of the fee shifting
rule.176 In Korea, the court of the first instance has decided 745,358
cases in 2014.177 However, only 31,324 claims for calculation of legal

172 Byeonhosabosuuisosongbiyongsanipegwanhangyuchik [Rule on Calculating Attorney’s Fees in Litigation Cost], S. Ct. Rule No. 758, Feb. 28, 1981, amended
by
Rule
No.
2496,
Nov.
27,
2013,
art.
3
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/변호사보수의소송비용산입에관한규칙
[https://perma.cc/X7AW-GJLW].
173 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 160, at 165-66.
174 Minsasosongbeob [Civil Procedure Act], Act No. 547, Apr. 4, 1960, amended
by
Act
No.
13952,
Feb.
3,
2016,
art.
110
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/민사소송법 [https://perma.cc/EU3B-3XPC].
175 There has been only one case where certification was denied of which the
plaintiff decided not to appeal against one defendant out of two defendants. The
case against the appealed defendant has been overturned in appeal. Because the
case against one defendant had not been appealed, the case between the plaintiff
and the defendant who was not appealed against has ended. But so far, I have not
found any evidence that any defendant who technically won a case file for the calculation of legal fees.
176 This comparison will not be completely accurate because of the following
reasons. First, it will not account for private settlement of legal fees. Second, civil
cases decided may be appealed to be settled at the appellate court. When the case
settles, each party typically pays for its own legal fees. Third, the prevailing party
may decide not to take any enforcement action on the losing party even after the
legal fee calculation is made.
177 SUPREME COURT OF KOREA, SABEOBYEONGAM [Annual Judicial Statistics] 736
(2015).
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fees have been filed in 2014.178 Although the prevailing party may
only choose to pursue legal fees when the amount-at-stake is high
enough to be worth pursuing, the enforcement of the loser pays rule
does not seem to be a common practice, which could mean that the
loser pays rule may currently work even less as a deterrent.
6.2.3. Discovery System
The lack of a discovery system may work as a barrier to the aggressive pursuit of class actions.179 In the United States, the discovery process allows for ease in gathering evidence and proving complex factual matters.180 In Korea, there is no such discovery process.
However, other tools supplement the lack of a discovery system
in Korea. First, the court may order, with or without a petition by
the parties, a person who has documents related to the lawsuit, to
submit them, subject to certain restrictions.181 The SCAA also allows
the court to investigate evidence without a petition by the parties,
when the court finds it necessary.182
Second, as we have seen above, the courts in Korea do not require the plaintiff to prove market efficiency in the class certification
stage. Since the plaintiff in the United States must prove that the
market was efficient at the class certification stage, it can be said that
it is easier for plaintiffs in Korea to file a class action, regardless of
the presence of a discovery system.
Third, Article 162 accounts for the lack of a discovery process.
As we have seen, most U.S. Rule 10b-5 class actions allege misrepresentation in the financial statement.183 In this sense, Article 162 may
be more comparable to Rule 10b-5 rather than the catch-all provision

Id. at 773.
See Warren III, supra note 13, at 1083-84 (2012).
180 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 160, at 200.
181 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 32 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
182 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 30 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
183 Cornerstone Research, supra note 74, at 8.
178
179
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in Article 179.184 And Article 162, which is a rule about misrepresentation of material facts in the Business reports that should be submitted to the Financial Services Commission, does not require the
plaintiff to prove reliance.185
Moreover, Article 162 does not require the plaintiff to prove scienter, but instead requires the defendant to prove that she was unable to know such facts were misrepresented although she exercised
reasonable care.186 This is a functional equivalent of shifting the burden to the defendant to disprove scienter in a Rule 10b-5 class action.
Also, the SCK has held that the defendant has the burden to
prove that the misrepresentation did not cause the loss in a non-class
action Article 162 case.187 The SCK allowed the defendant to use
event studies to disprove loss causation, but held that the defendant
does not meet her burden by showing a result that says it cannot be
said with certainty that the movement of stock price was caused by
the correction of misrepresentation.188
Lastly, there are also special considerations regarding damages
calculations. Specifically, the SCAA makes it clear that the court
may use various means, including the use of statistical methods,
when it is difficult to calculate the exact amount of damages.189
Moreover, Article 162 specifies formulas for the presumption of
damages.190 The presumptive amount of damages is calculated by
the difference between the amount actually paid or received by the
plaintiff, and (1) the market price of the securities at the date of the
closing of the trial proceedings if the securities is not sold, or (2) the

184 See Hwa-Jin Kim, Jeunggwonsosongeseoui ingwagwangyeironui jaejomyeong
[Rethinking Causation in Securities Fraud Litigations], 144 JEOSEUTISEU 209, 210-11
(2014) (explaining the impact of the fraud-on-the-market theory on Article 162).
185 See id. at 210.
186 Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobryul [Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act.
No.
14817,
Apr.
18,
2017,
art.
162
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ].
187 S. Ct., 2014Da207283, Jan. 29, 2015 (S. Kor.).
188 S. Ct., 2008Da92336, Aug. 19, 2010 (S. Kor.).
189 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 34 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
190 KIM, supra note 2, at 73.
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price at the time of the sale of the securities.191 Because of these provisions, proving damages for plaintiffs in Korean securities class actions may not be relatively difficult, as compared to U.S. counterparts.192 And considering the factors above, the lack of the discovery
process may not be the conclusive cause for the lack of class actions
in Korea.
6.2.4. Civil Juries
The availability of civil juries may also affect the behavior of
plaintiff’s counsel in securities class action. The reason may be that
fact-finding decisions made by civil juries are generally more unpredictable as compared to the decisions made by professional
judges.193 Another reason may be that juries could favor investors
alleging loss over publicly-traded corporations.194 For this reason,
there could be more incentive to initiate a securities class action
when civil juries are provided.195
While there are civil juries in the United States, there are no such
civil juries in Korea.196 But the lack of civil juries would not completely deter filings of class actions. The Delaware Chancery Court,

191 Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobyul [Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act
No.
14817,
Apr.
18,
2017,
art.
162
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ].
192 See Seoungwan Hahm, Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosongui jinhaengkwa
kwanryunhan myeot gaji jaenjeomdl [Some Issues Regarding SCAA Process], 43 BFL 69,
75 (2010) (noting that it is relatively easy to calculate damages when the securities
are sold before the date of the closing of the trial proceedings). Contra Hwanbong
Byun, Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosongbeobui silje unyongkwajeongeseoui moonjejeom
[Technical Problems of the SCAA], in JEUNGGWONGWANRYEONJIPDANSOSONGBEOB
GAEJEONGRON [REFORMING SCAA] 166, 180 (Seoul Bar Ass’n Legal Research Inst. ed.,
2014) (arguing that it is technically not possible to prove the market price of the
securities at the date of the closing of the proceeding before the end of the trial on
such date).
193 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 160, at 200.
194 See Warren III, supra note 13, at 1087.
195 See id. at 1086-87.
196 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VII, with Beobwonjojikbeob [Court Organization Act], Act No. 51, Sept. 26, 1949, amended by Act No. 14470, Dec. 27, 2016, art. 7
(S. Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/법원조직법 [https://perma.cc/CQ5MF8WH].
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a non-jury trial court, has attracted over seventy cases of merger litigation every year between 2005 and 2011.197 As long as there are
merits and economic incentives, the plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel
will be willing to file, even though the fact-finders are not less sophisticated civil juries, but professional judges.
7. RULE ON FILING FEES (AND FEE SHIFTING)
One factor that may not be deeply considered when deciding
whether to file a class action claim in the United States is the filing
fee amount. In the United States, the filing fee for a class action in
federal court is currently flat.198 Because the filing fee does not escalate with a function of the aggregate amount-at-stake, the filing fee
that the plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel should bear in a class action is
quite nominal.199
In Korea, the filing fee escalates gradually as a function of the
amount-at-stake.200 If the filing fee becomes high, it could work as
an entry barrier.201 But there is a ceiling to the filing fee in the SCAA,

197 See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 475 (2015) (providing
data on merger litigation over the period 2005 through 2011).
198 See Deborah R Hensler, The United States of America, in THE COSTS AND
FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGATION 535, 539 (Christopher Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer &
Magdalena Tulibacka eds., 2010) (explaining that the filing fees of the U.S. federal
and state courts are generally flat).
199 I thank Professor Fisch for pointing this out to me.
200 See Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 7
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법
[https://perma.cc/D2JY-NSLW]; Minsasosong deung injibeob [Act on the Stamps
Attached for Civil Litigation, etc.], Act No. 337, Sept. 9,1954, amended by Act No.
12892,
Dec.
30,
2014,
art.
2
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/민사소송등인지법 [https://perma.cc/5VEJ-LLK2].
201 See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 171 (1997) (noting that filing fees and amount-in-controversy requirements may serve as entry barriers which prevent the litigation of
some claims); see also Michael M. Karayanni, The Class Action Experience in Israel and
the Value of Having a Representative with a Personal Claim, in CROSS-BORDER CLASS
ACTIONS: THE EUROPEAN WAY 189, 195 (Arnaud Nuyts & Nikitas E. Hatzimihail eds.,
2014) (noting that in an escalating filing fee regime the amount of the filed claim in
a class action “can easily reach substantial amounts thereby making the fees the
plaintiff must pay very significant”).
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set at 50 million won.202 So if the amount-at-stake is sufficiently
high, then the filing fee will become flat. This rule gives the entrepreneurial attorney an incentive to identify and pursue cases with a
high amount-at-stake.
But the filing fee rule has a deterring effect on the lead plaintiff.
In Korea, the amount-at-stake used for the calculation of the filing
fee is not the amount-at-stake of the lead plaintiff, but of the whole
class.203 So the lead plaintiff will have to pay the filing fee for not
only herself, but also for other class members, in a class action. This
may not be an issue, if we consider that when an entrepreneurial
attorney takes the case on a contingent fee basis, she may be willing
to pay the filing fee for the plaintiffs.204 Because the contingent fee
she will receive is calculated not by the amount recovered by the
lead plaintiff, but by the amount recovered for the whole class, calculation of the filing fee for the whole class may not be over-inclusive if the fee is ultimately borne by the entrepreneurial attorney. It
can even be said that the mechanism has been formulated with the
entrepreneurial attorney in mind, since it deters individual plaintiffs
from actively pursuing a class action claim without an entrepreneurial attorney.
The entrepreneurial attorney may contract with the lead plaintiff
to reimburse the plaintiff in the event of a loss.205 But even assuming
that this kind of contract is allowed,206 the lead plaintiff would have

202 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, Feb. 27, 2013, art. 7 (S.
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW].
203 Id.
204 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 17, at 683 (“But unless the client is willing to invest
in the action by bearing litigation expenses, the attorney will still make the critical
investment decision, thereby reversing the normal roles of principal and agent.”).
205 It is difficult to find any discussion about whether this kind of contract is
legal and/or ethical in Korea. The legality or ethicality of the contract has not been
an issue because presumably such a contract is scarce. Korea does not have a history of entrepreneurial attorney, so the attorney will not be willing to make such a
contract. Discussions about professional ethics in the class action context focus on
advancing legal costs and contingency fee clauses. See, e.g., Changwan Son, Jipdangihoegsosongui beobjeok moonje – byunhosa yunrireul joongsimeuro [Legal Issues in
Entrepreneurial Class Action – Concentrating on Professional Responsibility], 54 BFL 6,
15 (2012) (arguing that the lack of an explicit statute provision shows that advancing legal costs does not violate professional responsibility); id. at 17-19 (discussing
the ethical boundaries of contingency arrangements).
206 See S. Ct., 2013Da28728, July 24, 2014 (S. Kor.) (holding that contract where
a third party agrees to fund legal costs with the other party agreeing to repay the
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to first assume the liability at the event of the loss. So, the lead plaintiff risks the plaintiff’s attorney becoming judgment proof.207
According to the Korean fee shifting rule, the fee to be shifted
escalates as the amount-at-stake goes up.208 The lead plaintiff would
risk paying the legal fees calculated by not only the amount-at-stake
for herself but also the amount-at-stake for the other class members.209 This rule may also potentially make class action uneconomical for the lead plaintiff.210
However, as discussed above, the fee shifting rule is not actively
enforced in Korea.211 Also, a judgment-proof plaintiff may still serve

legal cost after the dispute is resolved is unenforceable if the third party also acted
as the actual party of the dispute); S. Ct., 2014Da18322, July 10, 2014 (implying without deciding that a contract where the plaintiff’s attorney agrees to advance legal
costs for the plaintiff is not illegal). In Canada, an indemnity agreement by the
plaintiff’s counsel is allowed. WARREN K. WINKLER ET AL., THE LAW OF CLASS
ACTIONS IN CANADA 387 (2014) (noting that indemnity agreements between the
plaintiff and the plaintiff’s counsel became a norm of class action practice). In the
United States, states are split on whether a plaintiff’s attorney may agree to indemnify the plaintiff of adverse costs. Compare Oklahoma Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics
Comm., Op. 323 (2009), http://ethics.okbar.org/EthicsCounsel/EthicsOpinions/Opinion323.aspx [https://perma.cc/S8N6-Y63M] (“An Attorney may not
agree to indemnify his client against attorney’s fees and costs in the event that such
fees and costs are awarded to the opposing party and taxed as costs against the
client.”) (emphasis in original), with Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 2004-02
(2004), https://www.alaskabar.org/servlet/content/indexes_aeot__2004_2.html
[https://perma.cc/RT4W-C8HR] (allowing the plaintiff’s attorney to agree with
the plaintiff to assume responsibility for a client’s adverse attorney award in the
event that an appeal taken is unsuccessful).
207 See John C. Coffee, Jr., “Loser Pays”: The Latest Installment in the BattleScarred, Cliff-Hanging Survival of the Rule 10b-5 Class Action, 68 S.M.U. L. REV. 689,
699 (2015) (noting that even if the law firm serving as class counsel can indemnify
its client’s fee-shifting losses, the law firm may become insolvent and unable to
pay).
208 See footnote 172 and accompanying text.
209 See Hongki Kim, Urinara Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosongui Hyunhwangkwa
Kaeseonkwaje [Improving Ways of Securities Class Action Suit in Korea], 11
KYUNGJEBEOBYEONGU 59, 82 (2012) (arguing that a Korean investor will not have any
incentive to file a class action because the investor gains little when she wins but
pays a lot in legal fees when she loses).
210 Assume that the lead plaintiff has one dollar at stake, and there are 100 class
members with each class member having the same 1 dollar at stake. For sake of
simplicity, also assume that the fee shifting rule allows ten cents to be shifted for
every dollar. In this case, the lead plaintiff will recover one dollar if she wins, but
will have to pay ten dollars if she loses in a class action.
211 See footnote 174-78 and accompanying text.
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as a lead plaintiff.212 Lastly, there is the possibility of improper counseling by the attorney, to the potential plaintiff, about the risk involved at the time of the filing.213 So, the potential risk of fee shifting
may matter less when compared to the filing fee that should generally be paid upfront.214
The filing fee rule also deters the entrepreneurial attorney from
using the class action. That is because the entrepreneurial attorney
must pay the filing fee paid upfront if she chooses to pay the filing
for the class.215216
It is interesting to note that some plaintiff’s attorneys began to
file a class action alleging initially only a relatively small amount-atstake, that is 100,000,000 won,217 with a promise to expand the
amount-at-stake at a later date.218 The rationale given for this kind

212 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 207, at 699 (“Ironically, the one party who could
rationally serve as a lead plaintiff under a ‘loser pays’ rule will be the judgmentproof, nominal plaintiff with no assets.”).
213 See Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 269, 275 (2001) (noting the possibility of improper counseling
about the risk involved by Canadian plaintiff class counsels to representative plaintiffs).
214 The plaintiff’s attorney can try to mitigate the impact of the fee shifting rule
by splitting the claim. See Stephen B. Burbank, All the World His Stage, 52 AM. J.
COMP. L. 741, 758-60 (2004) (reviewing ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003)) (explaining the German practice of claim splitting).
215 See Karayanni, supra note 201, at 195-96 (arguing that fees might prove to
be a real obstacle for class actions if payment of the filing fee in advance is required
when filing a class action in an escalating filing fee regime); see also Coffee, Jr., supra
note 99, at 1915 (noting the upfront costs as a “procedural law [that] may to a degree
undercut the announced purpose of [SCAA]”).
216 The amount of the shifted fee in the event of a loss may also deter the plaintiff’s lawyer if the plaintiff demands that the lawyer indemnify the plaintiff.
WARREN K. WINKLER ET AL., supra note 206, at 413 (“An indemnity agreement, however, simply shifts the threat of the adverse costs award unto class counsel, who
may be sufficiently intimidated by the exposure to costs to decline to take on the
case in the first place.”).
217 This amount is approximately 87,308 U.S. dollars calculated by the currency
exchange rate of 1,145.37 won per one U.S. dollar as of October 31, 2016. For data
on currency exchange rate as of October 31, 2016, see FED. RES. SYS., supra note 111.
218 See, e.g., Seoul Western Dist. Ct., Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosongui sojegi
gonggo [Notice on Filing of Securities-related Class Action] (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/160128_slseobu.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RPF5-8A8F]. It is difficult to know whether the plaintiff’s counsel has raised the amount-at-stake after the filing of the cases because most of the
cases are still pending at the class certification stage or have just reached trial stage.
See appendix B. If the court allows the amount-at-stake to be raised after the class
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of action is that the scope of the class is not determined at the initial
filing of the complaint.219 This practice has the practical effect of
lowering the amount of the filing fee the plaintiff must submit upfront, causing it to become even lower than the flat filing fee practiced in the United States.220 And because the cap for legal fee shifting is calculated by a function of the amount-at-stake, this practice
may also limit the amount of legal fees to be shifted.
In another case, the complaint was filed with over 1,000 plaintiffs
as lead plaintiffs.221 The law firm representing this case gave notice
on its website requesting that the plaintiffs submit a certain amount
for payment of the filing fee.222
Because the filing fee deters class action filings, a few proposals
have been made. One scholar has suggested lowering the cap on
filing fees, arguing that the government should subsidize class actions since they have a deterrent effect on corporate misconduct.223
Another has suggested using a flat filing fee for class actions.224 Both
certification, then the plaintiff’s counsel will be able to lever up the stake after the
class certification issue has been settled.
219 See, e.g., Seoul Southern Dist. Ct., Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongui sojegi
gonggo [Notice on Filing of Securities Related Class Action] (Dec. 2, 2013),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/131202_slnambu.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MSB-Z9CR].
220 The filing fee for the amount-at-stake of 100,000,000 won is 47,500 won. See
Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action Act], Act
No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 7 (S. Kor.),
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법
[https://perma.cc/D2JYNSLW]. This amount is approximately 41 U.S. dollars calculated by the currency
exchange rate of 1,145.37 won per one U.S. dollar as of October 31, 2016. For data
on currency exchange rate as of October 31, 2016, see FED. RES. SYS., supra note 111.
221 Seoul
Central
Dist.
Ct.,
2014Ga-Hap31627
(S.
Kor.),
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/140626_seoul.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BRU9-9ZLW].
222
Jeongyul LLC, Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosong seoryu jechul mit
sosongbiyong ibgeum anne [notice for class action documets collection and cost
deposit]
(Nov.
10,
2015),
http://jeongyul.co.kr/this-is-a-blog-test/
[https://perma.cc/4G5X-6NZK] (requesting payments to cover the filing fee and
other anticipated costs to the plaintiffs).
223 Jung-Sik Choi, Jeunggwonjipdansosongjedoui hwalseonghwareul uihan jean
[Proposal for the Invigoration of Securities Class Action System], 53 BEOBHAKYEONGU
311, 326 (2014).
224 See Hyojeong Im, Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongui hwalseonghwa
bangane gwanhan yeongu [A Study on How to Promote Securities-related Class
Action], 147 (June 2015) (unpublished master’s thesis, on file with the Yonsei University Graduate School) (suggesting that a flat filing fee may be possible in a Korean class action context considering that a flat filing fee is already being used in
certain administrative cases).
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proposals will affect the incentives of the lead plaintiff and the entrepreneurial attorney because they will lower the cost the plaintiff
or the plaintiff’s attorney must pay in the event of a loss. However,
they do not address the exact cap amount or flat fee amount.
I propose using the alleged amount of the lead plaintiff’s
amount-at-stake to calculate the filing fee and the fee to be shifted.225
For a case to proceed as a class action, a flat fee will be separately
required as a cost to be borne by the plaintiff’s attorney.226 This proposal will have the following merits. First, it will allow the plaintiff
to consider only the merits of the class action without considering
the difference in filing fee and the fee to be shifted between individual filing and class action filing.227 Second, it will effectively lower
the filing fee, thus incentivizing the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney to use class action. Third, by using the amount-at-stake of the
lead plaintiff, it is possible to use the same formula that is used when
calculating the filing fee for monetary claims.

225 See Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, It’s for the Judges to Decide: Allocation of
Trial Costs in Israel Report on Israel, in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
177, 183 (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012) (explaining that courts usually required class
action plaintiffs to pay court fees only with respect to their personal claim in Israel
as of 2012); see also Karayanni, supra note 201, at 196 (explaining that the Israeli Supreme Court held that only the individual amount claimed for the representative
will be regarded as the amount of the action for fee purposes in class actions of
aggregated monetary amounts).
226 In Israel, the government charges a flat fee for class actions. See Chen
Ma’anit, Shaked Sets Fees to Stem Class Action Flood, GLOBES (Mar. 23, 2017, 6:19 PM),
http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-shaked-sets-fees-to-stem-class-actions-flood1001182423 [https://perma.cc/X4GH-YAVV]. I thank Benjamin Weitz for alerting
me to the recent change in Israel.
227 If we use a flat fee for class action filing, the plaintiff will pay a filing fee
calculated by the amount-at-stake if she files by herself but pay a flat fee when she
files a class action. So, the filing fee will affect the choice of the plaintiff. Even if we
lower the cap on filing fee, any amount that is above (or lower) the expected filing
fee of an individual action will affect the choice of the plaintiff whether to file a class
action or not.
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8. CONCLUSION
Opt-out type class action and contingency fee arrangements are
considered to be some of the major mechanisms that allowed entrepreneurial litigation to take hold in the United States.228 But considering the current practice in Korea, where the plaintiff’s counsels are
not aggressively filing for class action even though both mechanisms are present, other factors also seem to matter. I do not assert
that I have considered every variable in the civil procedure practices
that could affect the outcome here.
However, we should also note that while countries differ in law
and practice, there may be some other legal mechanisms or practices
which account for the present differences, to some extent. For instance, the lack of discovery could be accounted for by the substantive law, which eliminates certain elements, or procedural law,
which shifts the burden of proof for certain elements.
It may be possible that the use of the SCAA will increase in Korea in the future. The basic framework that allowed the class action
to thrive in the United States is implemented in Korean civil procedure, at least in the securities class action context. And other mechanisms that could possibly deter entrepreneurial attorneys from
pursuing securities class actions do not seem to be determinative.
Korean law on class certification may be even more favorable to entrepreneurial attorneys in Korea when compared to their U.S. counterparts.
The Filing fee rule may be one hurdle that deters the plaintiff or
the plaintiff’s attorney from using the securities class action in Korea. The escalating filing fee that takes the amount-at-stake of the
class members into account affects the incentives of the lead plaintiff
and the lead plaintiff’s attorney. By removing the other class members’ amount-at-stake from the filing fee formula, it may be possible
to incentivize the lead plaintiff and lead plaintiff’s attorney to use
the class action.
However, it should be noted that civil procedure is not the only
factor that affects the actions of lead plaintiffs and entrepreneurial
attorneys. As noted earlier, social and economic situations, such as
the size of the market capitalization of the listed corporations, may

See Coffee, Jr., supra note 153, at 217-18 (noting the effect of the class action
and the contingent fee arrangement on the lawyer as an entrepreneur).
228
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also affect their actions.229 To really understand the reason for the
differences in the practice of class action, we may have to look beyond civil procedure.

229 See Choi, supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Coffee, Jr., supra
note 99, at 1925 (noting the Korean experience when arguing that legislation will
not alone produce major change).
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APPENDIX TABLE A230
No.

1

2

3

Case
No.

Suwon
Dist.
Ct.,
2009GaHap882
9

Date
of
Filing

Plaintiff

2009.
4. 13.

Park
Yunpae,

No.
of

2010.
1. 7.

Seoul
Southern
Dist.
Ct.,
2011GaHap193
87

2011.
10.
13.

Defendant

Status

attorney
Plain
tiffs
2

Seoul
Investment
Club,
Inc.

Seoul
Central
Dist.
Ct.,
2010GaHap160
4

Plaintiff’s

Yang
Ilnam,

2

Choi
Young
mi

Lee Jaehyeong
et al.

186

2010. 4. 30.

Lawyer Jo
Yeongkil,
Jo Namtaek, Ham
Seungwan,
Choi
Soengjin,
Park
Sangbeom,
Cheong
Huiseon

Jinseong
TEC,
Inc., Ma
Youngjin, Yoon
Wuseok

Hannuri
Law (Lawyer in
charge:
Song
Seonghyeo
n, Kim
Sangwon,
Kim
Juyeong,
Park Pilseo)

Royal
Bank of
Canada

2017. 2. 15.

Hannuri
Law (Lawyer in
Charge:
Song
Eonghyeon,
Kim Sangwon, Kim
Juyeong)

DONGB
U Securities Co.,
Ltd.,

Pending in
the court of
first
instance.

Settled.

231

Settled.

Trustee
of Ssimotek Park
Younggu
232

230 Summarized by the Author using the data in the Supreme Court of Korea
website (www.scourt.go.kr).
231 Case against Ma Youngjin has been voluntarily dismissed on August 21,
2009, and case against Yoon Wuseok has been voluntarily dismissed on January 18,
2010.
232 Case against Trustee of Ssimotek Park Younggu has been voluntarily dismissed on March 8, 2012.
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4

Seoul
Southern
Dist. Ct.
2011GaHap230
03

2011
11.
25.

Yang Il
Nam,
Choi
Young
mi

2

Hannuri
Law (Lawyer in
charge:
Song
Seonghyeo
n, Kim
Sangwon,
Kim
Juyeong,
Park Pilseo,
Jeon
Youngjun)

HANH
WA
INVEST
MENT &
SECURI
TIES
CO.,
LTD.

Consolidated
to
Seoul Central Dist. Ct.,
2010GaHap1604
and given a
new
case
number of
Seoul Central Dist. Ct.,
2012GaHap509676.

5

Seoul
Central
Dist.
Ct.,
2012GaHap170
61

2012.
3. 2.

Kim
Soonde
ok et al.

5

Hannuri
Law (Lawyer in
charge:
Song
Seonghyeo
n, Kim
Sangwon,
Kim
Juyeong,
Park Pilseo,
Jeon
Youngjun)

Korea Investment
& Securities Co.,
Ltd.,
Deutsche
Bank
AG233

Judgement
for
the
plaintiff.

6

Seoul
Central
Dist.
Ct.,
2013GaHap743
13

2013.
10. 8.

Kim
Taeeun
g et al.

15

GS Engineering
& Construction
Corp.

Pending in
the court of
first
instance.

7

Seoul
Southern
Dist.
Ct.,
2013GaHap107
585,
2014GaHap100

2013.
11.
25.

Kim
Jiwun

1

Hannuri
Law (Lawyer in
charge:
Song
Seonghyeo
n, Kim
Sangwon,
Kim
Juyeong,
Jeon
Youngjun)
Geonjin
Law (Lawyer in
charge:
Park Pilseo)

Jang
Chul

Pending in
the court of
first
instance.

Yul Law
(Lawyer in
charge:
Byun

Case against Korea Investment & Securities Co., Ltd. has been voluntarily
dismissed on May 16, 2012.
233
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086 &
100093
(consol.)

8

9

289

Hwanbong)

Seoul
Western
Dist.
Ct.,
2013GaHap358
56

2013.
11.
26.

Suwon
Dist.
Ct.,
2013GaHap264
04

2013.
11.
26.

Kim
Jiwun

1

Geonjin
Law (Lawyer in
charge:
Park Pilseo)

Yu
Wangdo
n

Consolidated
to
Seoul Southern Dist. Ct.,
2013GaHap107585
and given a
new
case
number of
Seoul Southern Dist. Ct.,
2014GaHap100086.

Jin Matrix, Co.,
Ltd.

Consolidated
to
Seoul Southern Dist. Ct.,
2013GaHap107585
and given a
new
case
number of
Seoul Southern Dist. Ct.,
2014GaHap100093.

Yuanta
Securities (Korea) Co.,
Ltd. et al.

Pending in
the court of
first
instance.

Yuanta
Securities (Korea) Co.,
Ltd. et al.

Pending in
the court of
first
instance.

Yul Law
(Lawyer in
charge:
Byun
Hwanbong)

Kim
Jiwun

1

Geonjin
Law (Lawyer in
charge:
Park Pilseo)
Yul Law
(Lawyer in
charge:
Byun
Hwanbong)

10

Seoul
Central
Dist.
Ct.,
2014GaHap316
27

2014.
6. 13.

Seo
Wonil
et al.

1254

11

Seoul
Central
Dist. Ct.
2014Ga-

2014.
6. 10.

Kang
Jonggu
et al.

20
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Jeongyul
LLC (Lawyer in
charge:
Kim Hak
Sung, Lee Ji
Ho, Jeon
Jong Won,
Kim Seok
Bae, Lee
Hae Wook,
Woo-Jung
Jon, Hwang
Yunjeong,
Park Dong
Won, Jung
Jae Seop)
Jeongyul
LLC (Lawyer in
charge: Lee
Dae Soon,
Park Seo
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Jin, Park
Hwiyeong,
Mun Cheolju, Kim
Jee Eun,
Baek
Seungjae)

12

Seoul
Central
Dist. Ct.
2015GaHap904
7

2015.
3. 27.

Kim
Huidong et
al.

6

13

Seoul
Western
Dist.
Ct.,
2016GaHap304
18

2016.
1. 19.

Lee
Junsik

1

Lawyer Jin
Cheol
Youngjin
LLC (Lawyer in
charge: Yu
Kyungjae,
Kwak
Wonkon,
Mun Jin O
Hannuri
Law (Lawyer in
charge:
Kim Sangwon, Kim
Juyeong,
Song
Seonghyeo
n, Park Pilseo, Kim
Jeongeun,
Im Jimseong, Goo
Hyunjoo)

STX Offshore &
Shipbuilding
Co., Ltd.
et al.

Pending in
the court of
first
instance.

Samil
Accounting Corp.

Pending in
the court of
first
instance.

APPENDIX TABLE B234

No.

Case Number
for Trial

Case number for class certification

Status

1

Suwon Dist.
Ct., 2009GaHap8829

Suwon Dist. Ct., 2009Ka-Gi1048,
Jan. 21, 2010

Certified

2

Seoul Central
Dist.
Ct.,
2010Ga-

Seoul Central Dist. Ct.,2010KaGi9474 & 2012Ka-gi2082 (consol.),
May 1, 2012

Certification Denied

Summarized by the Author using the data in the Supreme Court of Korea
website (www.scourt.go.kr).
234
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Hap1604 &
2012GaHap509676

Seoul High Ct., 2012Ra764 & 765
(consol.), May 31, 2013

Affirmed

S. Ct., 2013Ma1052 & 1053 (consol.),
Apr. 9, 2015

Reversed to
be
remanded

Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra656 & 657
(consol.), Nov. 16, 2015

Certified

S. Ct., 2015Ma2056 & 2057 (consol.),
Mar. 28, 2016

Affirmed

Seoul Southern Dist. Ct.,2011KaGi2010, Sept. 27, 2013

Certified

Seoul High Ct., 2013Ra20093, Feb. 6,
2015

Affirmed

S. Ct., 2015Ma4027, Nov. 4, 2016

Affirmed

Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2012KaGi1273, Sept. 3, 2013

Certified

Seoul High Ct., 2013Ra1426, Jan. 13,
2014

Reversed

S. Ct., 2014Ma188, Apr. 9, 2015

Reversed to
be
remanded

Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra619, Jan. 29,
2016

Affirmed

S. Ct., 2016Ma251, May 27, 2016

Affirmed

Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2013KaGi6824, Feb. 12, 2015

Certified

Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra539, Jan. 29,
2016

Affirmed

S. Ct. 2016Ma253, June 10, 2016

Affirmed

6

Seoul Southern Dist. Ct.,
2013GaHap107585,
2014GaHap100086 &
100093 (consol.)

Seoul Southern Dist. Ct., 2013KaGi2787, 2014Ka-Gi10064 & 10065
(consol.)

Pending

7

Seoul Central
Dist.
Ct.,

Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2014KaGi3556, Sept. 29, 2016

Certification Denied

3

4

5

Seoul Southern Dist. Ct.,
2011GaHap19387

Seoul Central
Dist.
Ct.,
2012GaHap17061

Seoul Central
Dist.
Ct.,
2013GaHap74313
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Seoul High Ct., 2016Ra21279, Aug.
4, 2017

Affirmed

S. Ct. 2017Ma5883

Pending

8

Seoul Central
Dist.
Ct.
2014GaHap30150

Seoul Central Dist. Ct.,
2014Ka-Gi3443

Pending

9

Seoul Central
Dist.
Ct.,
2015GaHap9047

Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2015KaGi1755

Pending

10

Seoul Western Dist. Ct.,
2016GaHap30418

Seoul Western Dist. Ct., 2016KaGi44

Pending
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